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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to analyze economic 
reforms in Hungary and China, in order to determine what 
lessons may be applied in the Soviet Union.
In both Hungary and China, initial reforms were 
emphasized in the agricultural sector, rather than in the 
industrial sector. Both countries experienced economic 
growth when they utilized this method of reform.
When Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power in the Soviet 
Union in 1985, he did the reverse. He chose to delay 
reforms in the agricultural sector, and emphasized increased 
industrialization. This resulted in continued economic 
stagnation, that led the Soviet Union to the verge of 
collapse.
The Soviet Union needs to overcome the political and 
economic obstacles that delayed reforms in the agricultural 
sector. It is suggested that if the Soviet Union follows 
the Hungarian and Chinese examples, economic growth will 
increase and this will clear a path towards industrial 
modernization.
iv
THE PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC REFORM IN THE SOVIET UNION: 
WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM HUNGARY AND CHINA?
INTRODUCTION
The interconnected set of political and economic 
structures which comprise neo-Stalinism has influenced the 
economic systems of Hungary, China, and the Soviet Union in 
the pos-war era. According to Zaslavsky, Neo-stalinism is a 
less extreme derivation of Stalinism:
The Stalinist regime used systematic terror for 
the mobilization of social resources to accomplish 
rapid industrialization and property transfers. A 
centrally administered and planned economy replaced the 
market economy. Control over social production and 
distribution was exercised by the highly centralized 
party-state apparatus, which monopolized political, 
economic, and ideological power. The elimination of 
mass physical terror as a means of government by 
Stalin's successors still preserved many essential 
features of the old Stalinist state (notably the 
centralized one-party-state system).1
Since Stalin's death Moscow has tolerated increasing
deviation from the precepts of Soviet-style central
planning.2 However, the stagnation of the past has not
been replaced by any new and dynamic economic growth.
Almost from the beginning of communist rule in the countries
in this study, there has been a consistent trade-off between
Victor Zaslavsky, The Neo-Stalinist State: Class,
Ethnicity, and Consensus In Soviet Society (New York: M. E.
Sharpe, 1982), p. viii.
2William E. Griffith, ed., Central and Eastern Europe: 
The Opening Curtain? (London: Westview Press, 1989), p. 3 77.
2
3orthodoxy and economic growth. Despite staggering human 
costs, the neo-Stalinist model was initially successful in 
Hungary, China, and the Soviet Union as a method for 
building an industrial infrastructure in what were basically 
non-industrialized societies. However, in the later stages 
of development, these economies suffered from declining 
growth rates and reductions in labor and capital 
productivity that could not be resolved within the design of 
the existing model.
As Bialer recently suggested, the neo-Stalinist system 
has become obsolete and an obstacle to economic 
development.3 It cramps individual initiative, sustains a 
superfluous middle-level of administrators who cannot be 
removed without social conflict, and breeds a dispirited 
labor force lacking in discipline and incentive.u
Since Gorbachev came to power in 1985, perestroika has 
evolved into a program which both identifies the failures of 
the Soviet politico-economic model and conceptualizes a view 
of a future Soviet state with market-oriented and 
participative underpinnings. Under perestroika, the supply 
of producer goods was to be based on the wholesale market, 
not central allocation. Excessive controls were to be
3Seweryn Bialer, "Gorbachev's Program of Change:
Sources, Significance, Prospects," Political Science
Quarterly, vol. 103, no. 3, Fall 1988, p. 404.
4"Die Studie Von Novosibirsk," Osteuropa. No. 1, January
1984, p. A5.
4replaced by market incentives and autonomous production 
relations.5 However, unlike the case in some of the other 
reform-oriented socialist countries, perestroika in the 
Soviet Union has had very poor results.
The Gorbachev leadership has not undertaken a thorough 
overhaul of the economic system or breached the traditional 
canons of state socialism in the manner of marketizers in 
Hungary and China.6 The principal focus of "economic 
restructuring" in the Soviet Union emphasized industrial 
modernization. A more radical market-oriented approach 
would have required a fundamental restructuring of the 
existing system of economic management and basic changes in 
production relations in all economic sectors. Political 
compromises failed to tackle the sector where economic 
reform should have begun, namely in agriculture. Among 
other factors, conservatism and political inertia in this 
sector in the Soviet Union failed to foster any significant 
reform measures. Reforms in the agricultural sector in both 
Hungary and China have fared more favorably than reforms in 
the industrial sector. In the economic conference of June 
1987, Oleg Bogomolov pointed to the experience of other 
socialist countries:
5Peter Juviler and Hiroshi Kimura, eds., Gorbachev1s 
Reforms: U.S. and Japanese Assessments (New York: Aldine De
Gruyter, 1988), p. 85.
6Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum, eds., Gorbachev1s 
Russia And American Foreign Policy (London: Westview Press,
1988), p. 163.
5This experience shows that the quickest and most 
direct effect for the people is produced by the 
application of economic methods of leadership first in 
agriculture, trade,the light and food industries, and 
in housing construction...It is very characteristic 
that economic reforms...began in many countries 
precisely in agriculture.7
The agricultural reforms that have been introduced in 
China and Hungary represented a striking departure from the 
neo-Stalinist economic model. Reforms in Hungarian 
agriculture, which began in the 1950s, were implemented 
along a different course, yet still effectively. The state 
made a substantial investment in agriculture, and farm 
cooperatives were formed. The targets from planners were 
made flexible, and the cooperatives were allowed to buy and 
sell from each other at mutually accepted prices.8 In 
China, communes were disbanded in the 1970s, land was handed 
over to the peasants, and output targets were abolished.9 
In addition, Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were established 
as "experiments" with a more market-oriented approach.
Perestroika was intended to drag the Soviet Union away 
from the "abyss" and set it on course to modernization and 
prosperity.10 Notwithstanding the various attempts to 
devolve decision-making, the Soviet economy remains in all
7Pravda, June 13, 1987.
8Ibid., p . 3 6.
9Ibid., p . 3 6.
10Peter Frank, The World Today, Nov. 1989, vol. 45, no. 
11, (England: The Royal Institute of International Affairs),
p. 185.
important respects centrally-planned and centrally- 
controlled. In fact, until 1988, Gorbachev barely spoke of 
private enterprise, cooperatives, and small and medium-sized 
enterprises and said as little as possible about agriculture 
and the consumer sector. It is important to examine the 
failures and successes of reform programs in Hungary and 
China in order to determine what lessons may be drawn in 
order to foster economic reforms in the Soviet Union.
Hungary and China both achieved better economic results by 
initially emphasizing reform programs in their agricultural 
sectors. It is important to realize that when Gorbachev 
assumed power in 1985 in the Soviet Union, he focused his 
reform efforts upon the industrial sector. If he had 
followed the recent paths of Hungary and China, positive 
economic results would have occurred at a faster pace.
CHAPTER II
ECONOMIC REFORMS IN HUNGARY
2.1 Introduction
By 1950, Hungary had adopted the neo-Stalinist economic 
model in its entirety. This not only meant that Hungary 
introduced the same institutional and hierarchical 
structures, but that the direction of economic planning 
placed emphasis upon heavy industry and the forced 
collectivization of agriculture. Until 1956, agricultural 
output remained essentially unchanged.11 The result was a 
rapid growth of output but a decline in living standards.
In an attempt to realize centrally set economic goals, 
the Rakosi government flooded the economy with more and more 
regulations. The political leadership at this time felt 
that centralization with an emphasis on industrialization 
was a definite advantage because workers and intellectuals 
with limited experience were taking over the management of 
the economy. Thus, the human factor necessitated the
nBialer and Mandelbaum, p. 286.
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8strengthening of central control.12 This system of central 
planning operated independent of market forces and fostered 
the development of a hierarchy in which all central 
objectives became subordinate to fulfilling the plan.
Secretary General Rakosi was removed from power in 
1956. His government had been successful at blocking every 
effort to enact radical corrections. The delay in reform in 
1955-6, however, was no longer just an economic problem. It 
had definitely become an element of deepening political 
crisis which hindered the realization of economic reform.
The economic system established specific targets for the 
performance of enterprises, but was not conducive to an 
efficient, high-level of production. This is supported by 
the increased emphasis on foreign trade during this period. 
Hungary's economic development called for increased supplies 
of Western imports, and investment decisions were based upon 
foreign trade considerations.
Following the 1956 revolution, a new government was 
established under Janos Kadar. The new political leadership 
wanted to reconstruct and strengthen the socialist system by 
both maintaining and reforming basic principles. The slogan 
of a "dual front struggle" against anti-socialist and 
doctrinaire-Stalinist extremism expressed an immense effort 
to adapt to Hungarian circumstances. It was argued that
12Ivan T. Berend and Gyorgy Ranki, Hungary: A Century of
Economic Development (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), p.
201.
9agricultural policy had to serve this basic aim...it must 
assure a great increase of agricultural production in 
private farms and in the socialist sector of agriculture as 
well.13
The focus upon agriculture was certainly a political 
necessity. In order for the Kadar government to consolidate 
power, it needed the allegiance of the previously alienated 
agricultural peasantry. The method of compulsory delivery 
of agricultural products was stopped. Rakosi had previously 
called for the abolition of this system. The perpetuation 
of this system would have been a political disaster for the 
Kadar regime, so the basic pillars of the command economy in 
agriculture were destroyed.14 The state organs bought 
agricultural products from the peasants. And if they wanted 
to buy, they had to pay market prices for them. At least in 
this sector of the Hungarian economy, a planned market 
economy was introduced. This was a pioneering step towards 
a new economic model.
Measures of reform in the industrial sector during this 
period were ineffective. Industrial firms even urged the 
establishment of economic discipline for a better basis to
13For instance, see A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart 
Hatarozata Es Dokument Umai, 1956, p. 13.
14Berend and Ranki, p. 23 3.
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fulfill their plans. 15They felt that the state should 
determine what and how much they produced. Consequently, 
almost all activities in this sector remained under strict 
state control. The consequences of reform efforts in later 
decades still bore many similarities to the neo-Stalinist 
model.
The reform process in Hungary has not been a linear 
progression; it has undergone fluctuations and reversals. 
Because of the rapid consolidation of the Kadar regime, the 
importance of continuity was more often stressed during this 
period.16 It was nevertheless clear by the mid-1960s that 
Hungary was reaching the limits of a neo-Stalinist model.
For example, by this time the labor sources, which had 
created an easy way to extensive industrialization, became 
exhausted. With a shortage of labor becoming ever more 
severe (and little labor available for transfer from 
agriculture) economic growth could only proceed on the basis 
of faster productivity growth.17 The political leadership 
recognized that the incentive structures of the neo- 
Stalinist model were not effective at delivering 
productivity increases.
15Karen Dawisha, Eastern Europe Gorbachev and Reform: The
Great Challenge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1990), pp. 176-7.
16Ibid. , p. 178.
17Ivan T. Berend, The Hungarian Economic Reforms: 1953-
1988 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 197.
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More comprehensive reforms occurred with the 
introduction of the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) in 1968.
The thrust of the NEM was the abandonment of central 
planning in favor of a combination of the self-regulating 
market mechanism and central control exercised through 
indirect, market-compatible fiscal and monetary 
instruments.18 The NEM did succeed in temporarily cutting 
enterprises loose from central authorities, and led to a 
reduction in their size. Between 1968 and 1973, the average 
annual growth rate under this system was close to 7 per 
cent.19 However, the NEM was npt complemented by a 
depoliticization of economic life. The problem was that by 
eschewing any political changes, the 1968 reform failed to 
establish the necessary institutions for solving the clashes 
of interests that developed in the reform process. Ad hoc 
economic regulators fostered an arbitrary economic policy.
The realization of NEMs objectives was frustrated in 
the early 1970s by resistance, reversals, and backsliding by 
the Kadar leadership. From 1973 to 1978, a political 
counter attack blocked continuing reform. Individuals 
opposing Kadar's policies exploited the social tension that 
had arisen as a result of unequal increases in income. This
18Josef C. Brada and Istvan Dobozi, eds., Money. 
Incentives, and Efficiency In The Hungarian Economic Reform 
(New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1990), p. 3.
19Thomas H. Naylor, The Gorbachev Strategy: Opening The
Closed Society (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company,
1988) , p. 55.
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had made it possible to criticize the reform program as 
encouraging private activity, which neglected workers' 
interests.20 Although the reform principles were not 
abandoned in favor of a return to central planning, there 
was less scope for independent action, and the market's 
influence was much smaller than the original reform had 
envisioned.
Wider parameters of informal state intervention 
gradually re-strengthened centralization. Enterprises in 
Hungary continued to suffer from intervention by their 
ministerial superiors. Traditional modes of behavior on the 
part of central planners and enterprise directors were 
deeply entrenched; they did not change easily even after 
such a radical reform as the NEM was introduced. This 
stopped the previously dynamic development of small 
enterprises for a number of years.
Additionally, the major consequence for Hungary of the 
large increase in world prices of oil and other imported raw 
materials during this period was a sharp deterioration in 
its terms of trade with other countries. During 1974-78, 
the terms of trade worsened by approximately 2 0 per cent.21 
This development, coupled with a rapid expansion in the 
volume of imports from the West, led to a steady increase in
20Paul Hare, Hugo Radice, and Nigel Swain, Hungary: A
Decade of Economic Reform (London: Allen and Unwin, 1981),
p. 73.
21Bialer and Mandelbaum, p. 4.
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Hungary's trade deficit. The total amount of foreign debt, 
which started to accumulate in 1974, reached 4.8 billion 
dollars in 1977 and 8.1 billion dollars in 1980.22 
Economic policy shifted toward moderating the growth of 
domestic demand and making additional goods available for 
export to the West.
The Kadar leadership, occupied with restrictions on 
enterprise autonomy and strengthening its international 
position, substantially lost its ability to perceive 
economic problems, and hardly reacted to them. State-owned 
industries like steel and coal were draining the economy 
with losses. The Hungarian government heavily taxed the 
private and more productive areas of the industrial sector 
to subsidize these inefficient enterprises. By 1976, the 
leadership realized that its reaction to the crises of the 
early 197 0s had been unsuccessful. The retrenchment policy 
and the return to hierarchical management had failed.23 
The leadership wanted to adapt the lessons learned from 
agriculture to the industrial sector. They began to re- 
encourage the development of small enterprises and reduce 
state subsidies. In 1980, the amount of central subsidies to
enterprises decreased to 40 per cent of that in 1979.24 At
22Bialer and Mandelbaum, p. 246.
23Eva Kerpel and David G. Young, Hungary To 1993: Risks
And Rewards Of Reform (London: Economic Intelligence Unit,
1988), p. 25.
24Ibid. , p . 25.
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the initiative of the center, 200 new companies were 
established by breaking up a number of large inefficient 
enterprises. The majority of state-owned restaurants and 
small shops were given over to private individuals on a 
rental basis from the state.
The problem in Hungary has been, therefore, waves of 
reform measures that have displayed great discrepancies 
between their anticipated impacts and their actual effects. 
This has led many workers and managers, especially in the 
industrial sector, to apply ’’wait and see” tactics as a 
means of self-defense.25 When there appeared to be an 
insufficient response to newly introduced regulators, the 
center simply decided that the regulators themselves were to 
be blamed, and they were continuously changed.
With the reform process advancing in the 1980s, there 
was a need for change in the political apparatus. It was 
only a start to eliminate the dominance of planned 
directives. The developments through the mid-1980s were 
still insufficient concerning the emergence of market 
relations. By the end of the 1980s there was a truly 
national constituency in support of reform that would open u 
the economic and political system. Consequently, in June 
1987, Kadar appointed Karolyi Grosz as premier. Grosz had 
criticized the handling of the economy by the Kadarists and
25Ibid. , p. 5.
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castigated Hungary's workers for low productivity.26 The 
seventh five-year plan (1986-91) estimated that real growth 
would average only 2 per cent each year.27 Because Grosz 
could not make great strides as long as the Kadarist 
conservatives dominated the top party and state organs, he 
challenged them at a May 1988 conference. The conference 
endorsed the replacement of Kadar as first party secretary 
with Grosz. In early 1990, parliamentary elections brought 
an end to almost 45 years of Communist totalitarian rule in 
Hungary. Grosz was replaced by Resno Nyers, and a special 
party Congress was held to ratify the inauguration of 
Hungary's first multiparty elections since 194 7. Reforms
have now taken a new path -toward the full scale
introduction of capitalism. The Hungarian government 
launched a campaign to privatize the country's state-owned 
economy. Although Kadar had not duplicated the Soviet 
system in its entirety, he was not interested in 
establishing market relations either. Much like the present 
case in the Soviet Union, Kadar's policies of gradual change 
went further than he ever imagined.
26Minton F. Goldman, The Soviet Union And Eastern Europe.
3rd ed. (Connecticut: Dushkin, 1990), p. 116.
27Dawisha, p. 177.
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2.2 The Agricultural Sector
In the early 1950s, the government utilized ruthless 
methods and pressure to make private farming impossible. In 
1952-53, only 1 per cent of grain was sold on the free 
market.28 Before Kadar assumed power, 5,22 4 cooperatives 
were founded but only represented 26 per cent of Hungarian 
agriculture.29 The other 74 per cent of the cooperatives 
offered their land to the state. The Party had traditional 
communist doubts about the ability and willingness of the 
agricultural sector to provide industry with the support 
necessitated by reform. Even more important, there was 
concern about the extent of political control the leadership 
could exercise over farm cooperatives.
Following the revolution in Hungary in 1956, compulsory 
deliveries in agriculture were abolished, and many members 
of collectives left to become private farmers. Kadar's idea 
was to invest heavily in the countryside and persuade the 
peasants of the advantages of large-scale cooperative 
farming. Unlike the industrial sector of the Hungarian 
economy, the agricultural sector was stripped of the 
institutional foundations of the neo-Stalinist model.30 In
28Berend and Ranki, p. 201.
29Berend and Ranki, p. 201.
30Berend, p. 57.
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agriculture's case the command economy was not merely 
reformed, measures were initially taken to dismantle it.
After 1956, the distinguishing feature in the 
agricultural sector was the cooperative movement, which 
combined individual initiative and large-scale co-operation. 
The activities of the cooperatives covered everything in the 
rural economy, from the repairs of equipment to the 
production of crops. The cooperatives could buy and sell 
from each other at mutually acceptable prices.31 Prices 
for most agricultural products reflected conditions of 
supply and demand, and the cooperatives operated in a more 
market-oriented environment.
Cooperative members were provided with land that they 
could use as their own but could not pass on to their heirs. 
Even more importantly, the Kadar regime recognized the 
necessity of having cooperatives elect their leaders without 
excessive interference from above. This had been the root 
cause of two out of three farmers leaving their land prior 
to the establishment of Kadar's regime.
This method of agricultural reform that the Kadar 
government adopted rejected the use of administrative 
methods to eliminate private peasant farming. One 
innovation that had dramatic effects was share cultivation 
within the cooperatives, known also as "family work
31Padma Desai, Perestroika In Perspective: The Design And 
Dilemmas Of Soviet Reform (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1989), p. 36.
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organization."32 Under this system, the land of the 
cooperative was divided into shares worked as family 
holdings by the cooperative members. This program served to 
foster a firm incentive plan for the peasants employed on 
the cooperative. Between 1956 and 1961, gross agricultural 
production increased by nearly 10 per cent.33 This 
foundation in agriculture was the most important and most 
effective element of the post-1956 reform policy.
It is essential to remember that this program was 
implemented during a time when there was deep concern among 
many government officials about adhering to the socialist 
path of development. The leadership that formulated the 
agricultural policy during this period had to confront these 
doctrinaire beliefs, as the following excerpt from 
Kozgazdasaai Szemle demonstrates:
But as the collective farm develops rapidly, the 
household plot gradually loses its significance, at 
first to an absolute degree...Initially [household 
farming] is also significant from the point of view of 
supplying the country...In the later period, when 
socialism has developed, its role in producing 
commodities steadily diminishes until it finally 
disappears, and its role in the members' personal 
consumption gradually falls as well.34
During this period, reforms in the agricultural sector were
"sold" as an evil transition period in Hungary. There was a
32Berend, p. 95.
33Berend and Ranki, p. 233.
34Erno Csizmadia, "Transitional Forms and Solutions," 
Kozqazdasaqi Szemle. 1986, p. 1286.
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large upsurge in the production and number of small and 
medium-sized agricultural units during this period. 
Cooperation between small producers and large agricultural 
firms was strengthened, especially with regard to labor- 
intensive products.35 These increased incentives for the 
small producers resulted in production that was better 
adapted to market needs, especially in regard to producing 
more than one commodity.
After the introduction of the NEM in 1968, the 
percentage of state-owned farms steadily declined, while the 
percentage of cooperatives increased. At the same time, the 
percentage of individuals employed on private farms 
increased. In fact, by 1988 seventy-five per cent of 
Hungarian farms were managed by 1,3 60 independent 
cooperatives, which cultivated eighty per cent of the 
land.36 There were also over 100 state-owned farms that 
represented only fifteen per cent of the total number of 
farms. The remaining ten per cent of the farms were 
privately owned. In the five years after the introduction of 
NEM, while the national economy as a whole suffered a
35Gabor Revesz, Perestroika In Eastern Europe: Hungary1s
Economic Transformation. 1945-1988 (London: Westview Press,
1990), p. 93.
36Kerpel and Young, p. 33.
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foreign trade deficit, agriculture maintained a favorable 
balance of 3 billion 100 million foreign exchange forint.37
In the 197 0s, Kadar suggested the need for an 
institutional convergence that would bring state and 
cooperative ownership closer together to develop a 
homogenous communist public ownership out of the merger of 
the two. Based on this principle, he considered it 
necessary to merge the cooperative farms and form units as 
large as possible.38 Nevertheless, the self-management 
that was introduced earlier in the agricultural sector had 
substantially contributed to the development of incentives 
and awareness. It created a vested interest in the long­
term development of self-management, despite Kadar's 
retrogressive policies. Even in state-owned farms, the role 
of the central administration has been smaller than in the 
case of the industrial sector.
By 1975, the government was generally persuaded of the 
enduring importance of both cooperatives and private 
farming. Kadar's actions attested to this by his attendance 
at the 1976 Congress of Agricultural Cooperatives and his 
stress upon the unity of the household plot and the 
cooperative farms. The results of this reform process attest 
to the progress that has occurred in the agricultural
37William F. Robinson, The Pattern Of Reform In Hungary: 
A Political, Economic and Cultural Analysis (New York:
Praeger, 1973), p. 109.
38Berend, p. 220.
21
sector. Gross production in the industrial sector declined 
from 7.2 to 2.6 per cent between 1971 and 1981. In the 
meantime, gross production in the agricultural sector 
increased from 4.2 to 6.7 per cent.39
Throughout the 1970s, Hungary's agricultural growth was 
second in the world only to that of Holland. As Swain 
recently observed, Hungarian agriculture can be regarded as 
a remarkably fruitful symbiosis between "socialist wage 
labour" and traditional "family labour."40 To the extent 
that acceptance of market forces is a key measure of the 
reform of neo-Stalinist economies, the Hungarian agriculture 
sector can be said to have been "reformed.1,41 In fact, by 
1987, private farms were double the number of state farms, 
and there were three times as many cooperatives as state 
farms in Hungary. By this time, Hungary was able not only to 
supply the country with food, but its exports rose from 11.4 
per cent in 1971 to 14.2 per cent in 1987 .42 This was 
quite an achievement, given that Hungary was the only net 
food exporter in the Warsaw Pact.
39Bialer and Mandelbaum, p. 33.
40Norman Swain, Collective Farms Which Work? (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 34-5.
41Griffith, p. 223.
42Kerpel and Young, p. 34.
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2.3 The Industrial Sector
In the decade after the revolution of 1956, the reforms 
introduced in the industrial sector were more limited than 
those in the agricultural sector. The central focus of 
industrial reforms has been the socialist enterprise. It is 
the basic production unit of industry that is state-owned 
and has been rigidly controlled by state bureaucrats who 
know little about production and economics.43
However, from 1956 to 1968, the number of centrally 
prescribed indicators for enterprises was reduced, and 
profit sharing with workers was introduced.44 The reforms 
did not greatly advance the efficiency of enterprise 
operations. The managers of state-owned enterprises had 
very little control over which products they produced, how 
they were produced, or how they would be marketed, either 
domestically or internationally. Under such a rigid, 
inflexible system, there were few incentives for innovation 
or the efficient use of scarce resources.45 Nevertheless,
43John McMillan, John Whalley, and Lijing Zhu, "The Impact
of China's Economic Reforms On Agricultural Productivity
Growth," Journal of Political Economy. August 1989, vol. 97, 
pp. 781-2.
44Peter Van Ness, ed., Market Reforms In Socialist
Societies; Comparing China and Hungary (London; Lynne
Rienner, 1989), p. 53.
45Naylor, p. 57.
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Hungary underwent relatively rapid industrialization based 
principally on the development of heavy industry. This 
progress was achieved at a high cost to economic efficiency 
and led to imbalances in the economy, which hindered the 
growth of export sectors.
With the introduction of the New Economic Mechanism in 
1968, enterprises were expected to work out their own plans 
and arrange for their own input supplies and output 
marketing in an attempt to reinstate a form of market 
mechanism into the economy. The NEM instituted a policy 
whereby enterprise management was given discretionary power 
over short-term production and sales schedules. At least 
theoretically, the reforms reinstated the profit incentive 
and introduced decentralized planning and control into the 
state-owned enterprises. Macro-economic planning went on 
very much as before, but enterprise activity was to be 
guided by so-called economic regulators: wage policy,
profits taxation, price policy, credit policy, and so on/6 
However, in practice, even after the NEM got under way, most 
prices remained centrally determined; indeed, prices seldom 
reflected either production costs or supply and demand/7 
The vast majority of enterprises remained socially owned, 
with the state making strategic business decisions.
A6Stephan Feuchtwang, Athar Hussain, and Thierry Pairault,
Transforming China1s Economy In The Eighties (London: 
Westview Press, 1988), p. 54.
47Griffith, p. 223.
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Furthermore, there was some decentralization of 
authority in relation to foreign trade transactions as well 
as investment, but in both these areas the center chose to 
retain substantial control. The strict division of labor 
between big firms and their subsidiaries, as well as the 
high degree of industrial concentration and resultant lack 
of competition remained essentially the same.48 
Furthermore, decisions regarding the wage structure and 
pricing policy remained highly centralized. Thus, even 
before the retrenchment of the 1970s, success in this sector 
was limited. Most large industrial monopolies remained 
intact and economic regulators simply replaced directives.
The early 1970s represented a period of limited 
recentralization, combined with rapid growth based on heavy 
foreign borrowing. Output of socialist industry grew at an 
average annual rate of 6.4 per cent during 1971-75, but 
slowed down during 1976-80 to 3.4 per cent.49 The growth 
of heavy industry was faster than that of light industry 
during both periods. Large industrial enterprises reacted 
to the deterioration in their relative economic positions 
and to the decline in the prestige of their managers and 
workers by criticizing the impact of the reform measures.50
48Brada and Dobozi, p. 22.
49Bialer and Mandelbaum, p. 5.
50Ness, p. 57.
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Consequently, the party decided to provide "state 
protection" to six of the country's largest industrial 
firms, meaning that they would be saved from bankruptcy 
irrespective of performance. In further revision of the 
NEM, the trend toward decentralization was reversed in 1973 
when fifty of the largest enterprises were ordered to absorb 
a number of smaller factories. Although the Kadar 
leadership recognized that some of the country's smaller 
firms were doing well under NEM, it claimed that the large 
enterprises suffered because of unfair competition by 
smaller firms that offered flexible assignments and bonuses 
to managers.
The late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed a renewed 
encouragement of individuals to engage in private activity 
outside of the enterprise. However, as of 1984, only 
164,900 people were employed in these associations.51 To 
apply to industry the positive experiences gained in 
developing small-scale agricultural production, the 
Hungarian government decided in 1982 to implement a new law 
in the handicraft industry. It provided that private 
enterprises that employed fewer than 3 0 workers would be 
allowed to operate. The National Planning Office indicated 
that this new wave of economic reforms was intended "to 
encourage autonomous, entrepreneur-type, dynamic, and 
innovative managers who are able to mobilize the internal
51Kerpel and Young, p. 39.
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resources of the economy and make enterprises, collectives, 
and workers interested in the improvement of the efficiency 
of management."52
As with other elements of the reform process, the 
pioneering experiences in the agricultural sector led to the 
drawing of conclusions about the industrial sector. This 
connection was openly expressed by Ferenc Havasi in his 
speech proposing the Central Committee's reform resolution:
Will company autonomy, its extent, and the 
ensuring on our part of extensive rights to companies 
of disposal over property not lead to a weakening of 
the central state intention, to an undesirable 
strengthening of group interest? In answering this 
question it is worth referring to the experiences of 
the Hungarian cooperative movement... Today we already 
know how this greater independence furthered the 
emergence of responsible entrepreneurial behavior in 
economic activity...It was in this sector that a few 
commendable methods of economic activity emerged and 
became general practice...These, now that the system of 
management is being further developed, we want to 
utilize in a broader sphere.53
It was also that the price, wage, credit, and tax 
systems were too complex, and were subject to bargaining 
between enterprises and the central authorities, resulting 
in frequent rule changes.54 Large industrial firms were 
not as specialized as smaller firms, and thus suffered from
52National Planning Office, "Guidelines of The Further 
Development of The Hungarian Economic Management System," 
1985, pp. 3-4.
53Ferenc Havasi, "A Gazdasagiranyitas Tovabbfejlesztese
(The Further Development of Economic Management) , Kozaazdasagi 
Szemle. no. 5, 1984, p. 21.
54Ness, p. 71.
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slow changes in their response to state orders and high unit 
costs of production. The technological revolution in the 
1980s demanded a division of labor among smaller and more 
diversified production units.
Private and cooperative enterprises were definitely 
more profit-oriented, especially over the long-term, than 
state enterprises. For example, total industrial production 
in Hungary grew by 3.7 per cent in 1987, but the production 
of industrial cooperatives grew by 9.9 per cent.55 
Furthermore, the above-mentioned results secured by small- 
scale agricultural production could hardly be sustained 
without adequate mechanization and modernization.
As a result of this, by the late 1980s, most medium­
sized industrial firms and some large state-owned 
enterprises became controlled by enterprise councils. These 
were composed of elected representatives of the enterprises 
employees and representatives of management. Although the 
managing director remained responsible for day-to-day 
operational decisions, the council exercised property rights 
transferred to it by the state. By the end of 198 6, nearly 
half of the 720 state-owned industrial enterprises were 
operating under some form of self-management.
55Kerpel and Young, p. 39.
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2.4 Conclusions
The changes in the industrial sector of the Hungarian 
economy reveal that although there was decentralization of 
decision-making regarding current inputs and outputs before 
1988, there was virtually no institutional political change 
to accompany this reform. This impeded the progress of the 
reform in a number of ways, as well as facilitated some 
recentralization in the 1970s in response to the economy's 
problems.56 Hungary was hoping that the outside world 
could spur domestic investment, but the lesson has been 
provided that an economic base for these activities must be 
developed. The situation in Hungary provided the lesson for 
China and the Soviet Union that substantial decentralization 
of current production decisions to enterprises is not 
sufficient to improve the economy's domestic performance.
The most difficult problem is for the political leadership 
to restrain their persistently excessive demand for foreign 
investment in their country.
Hungary also demonstrated the importance of not 
providing subsidies to inefficient state-owned enterprises. 
Not only do these protected enterprises continue to bring 
losses, they are unable to compete in the international 
arena. Like Hungarian managers, Soviet and Chinese managers
56Feuchtwang, et al., p. 54.
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must compete in the international market without being 
rescued by the central leadership.
In Hungary as in China and the Soviet Union, most of 
the central administrators wanted as little change as 
possible in the structure of the economy. For example, 
Kadar, Deng Xiaoping, and Gorbachev had to confront 
political resistance to agricultural reform. Fundamental 
reform in this sector necessarily deprived a large share of 
the party apparatus of the reason for its existence.
Hungary provided the lesson that political and economic 
reform must therefore occur simultaneously. The 
agricultural sector showed that if the ministries are not 
effectively deprived of their detailed supervision of 
enterprises, the economy is unlikely to recover or 
strengthen.
The years following the introduction of the New 
Economic Mechanism in 1968 taught Hungarian political 
reformers that even incomplete changes may be better than no 
changes at all. Following this period, any growth in the 
Hungarian economy came from formal or informal private 
activities. Although the private sector was initially very 
limited in Hungary, the emphasis given to cooperatives in 
the agricultural sector helped to lay a foundation for 
improved economic performance.
During this learning process of reform, in many 
instances "brakes" that were built into the economic system
30
were more powerful than the throttles.57 Various reform 
efforts have attempted to abolish the system of mandatory 
directives from above, but history provided the lesson that 
Hungary needed to concentrate on the elimination of the 
hierarchical system of relations between the bureaucracy and 
the enterprises.
Agricultural reforms cleared a path towards this goal, 
but living with two systems meant that retreats were as 
frequent as progressions. Unlike the industrial sector, the 
agricultural sector had a small number of state-owned 
enterprises surrounded by a large number of more 
competitive, more market- and profit-oriented cooperatives 
and private household firms.58 From 1979 through the 
1980s, economic policy in Hungary sought to correct the 
imbalances associated with earlier growth by emphasizing the 
flow of resources into the agricultural sector.
The examples of Hungary and (more recently) China show
that market- and incentive-oriented reforms work better--
and yield results more quickly in the agricultural sector
than in the industrial. This advantage results because 
there are no monopolistic producers in agriculture and 
viable incentive systems are therefore easier to introduce. 
Investment decisions also tend to be easier. Partly for
57Kerpel and Young, p. 22.
58Victor Nee and David Stark, eds., Remaking The Economic 
Institutions of Socialism: China and Eastern Europe
(California: Stanford University Press, 1989), p. 53.
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these reasons, the central authorities were more willing to 
release their bureaucratic grip on agriculture than on the 
industrial sector.
In any case, the most fundamental lesson of the 
Hungarian experience was to reveal how difficult and time- 
consuming it can be to transform a neo-Stalinist economy. 
There was often a lack of consistent adherence to the 
original reform plans. When new circumstances emerged in 
and outside of the country, the political leadership failed 
to respond in a flexible way. Frequent rule changes often 
caused confusion among workers and managers who did not know 
how to respond to the changing rules of the game.59
However, as the next chapter demonstrates, this does 
not always have to be the case. In contrast to Hungary, 
China's reforms are being achieved in a much shorter period 
of time. Whereas Hungary's successful agricultural reforms 
preceded industrial reforms by a decade, in China the two 
stages have proceeded together. The apparently quick 
success of the new arrangements in Chinese agriculture, 
which improved both the food supply and the supply of raw 
materials for industry, was the main reason agricultural 
reforms were extended into Chinese urban areas in the 
1980s.60
59Ness, p. 210.
60Feuchtwang et al., p. 57.
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Not unlike Hungary, China in the 1980s arrived at the 
state of neither plan nor market, with the market striving 
to dominate agriculture and the plan still largely dominant 
in the industrial sector. As Revesz has suggested:
It is worth noting that the very successful 
changes in China in the 1980s were in many ways based 
on the Hungarian experience; likewise, Gorbachev's 
perestroika and the subsequent economic renewal in 
several Eastern European countries have numerous points 
in common with events that began in Hungary some twenty 
years ago.61
61Revesz, pp. ix-x.
CHAPTER III 
ECONOMIC REFORMS IN CHINA
3.1 Introduction
This chapter will focus on an analysis of economic 
reforms in China since 1978. A complex set of political and 
economic reasons lay behind the profound changes in China!s 
development strategy at the end of 1978. Among them were 
poor economic results that had resulted from previous reform 
efforts, the inertia of the middle bureaucracy, and 
divergences among the leadership. The reforms, implemented 
under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, aimed to reduce state 
control over the economy, open the way to economic 
interactions with the rest of the world, and replace mass 
mobilization with personal incentive as the chief motivator 
of human effort.62 Analyzing the economic effects of 
reforms in the agricultural and industrial sectors reveals 
that the former have fared more favorably over the past 
decade than the latter.
62John Woodruff, China In Search of Its Future: Years of
Great Reform. 1982-87 (Seattle: University of Washington
Press, 1989), p. 14.
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The reform process in China attempted to overhaul the 
economic system. The beginning of economic reforms dated 
back to 1958 when the government first decided to relinquish 
some of its central powers of economic control. At that 
time, 87 per cent of the Chinese state enterprises, which 
had been managed by central government ministries, were 
turned over to local provinces.63 However, that change in 
management simply shifted the level of administration, and 
the enterprises remained as appendages of local ministries.
In 1958, part of the reason the economy faltered was the 
haste in collectivizing the ownership of land, farming 
tools, and agricultural animals. There was also a lopsided 
stress in China, Hungary, and the Soviet Union on developing 
heavy industry at the expense of agriculture. The 
consequent failures that resulted from these policies 
dampened’ the people*s enthusiasm and hope for any realistic 
improvement in their standard of living.
In 1970, another economic reform attempt took place in 
China. Of a total 400,000 state-run enterprises, the 
managerial control of 2,000 large enterprises was again 
transferred to the local ministries. Much like the 
situation in 1958, the controlling power of the enterprises 
was shared by the central government and the local 
ministries. Both of these economic reform efforts by the
63George C. Wang, ed., Economic Reform In The PRC 
(Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), p. 1.
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political leadership failed to restructure the economy, 
i.e., to allow an enterprise to operate as an independent 
economic entity, responsible for its own profits and losses.
Although the Cultural Revolution exalted the role of 
the masses and made "serve the people" its central slogan, 
ironically, it was associated with an intensification of 
hierarchy on the one hand and a slighting of the masses' 
material needs on the other.6A At the end of 1976, China 
passed through a phase of struggle between "reformers," led 
by Deng Xiaoping, and "moderates," led by Hua Guofeng. The 
reformers advocated a path for China that was diametrically 
opposed to that of the Cultural Revolution, while the 
moderates sought to find a mean between the two positions.
At the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Central 
Committee in December 1978, the reformers won out decisively 
and their program was formally adopted as the national 
development guide. The new Chinese leaders recognized that 
previous reform efforts had undertaken the wrong path 
towards economic restructuring. Deng Xiaoping attempted to 
shift attention from the political struggle to economic 
construction.
Under the neo-Stalinist system that had existed before, 
the decision-making authority of enterprises was extremely 
limited, and there was little incentive to assume initiative
6AVictor D. Lippit, The Economic Development Of China 
(New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1987), p. 120.
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even when it was possible. The result was the full range of 
problems that are presently confronting the Soviet Union: 
declining economic efficiency reflected in increasing 
capital requirements per unit of output, poor quality, and 
severe underutilization of capacity due to procurement 
difficulties, among others.
In the political debate that arose in the Chinese 
leadership between devoting investment towards the 
industrial and agricultural sectors, agriculture won, but 
not without a struggle. The long lead period of projects, 
their often high costs, waste, and low rate of profitability 
were the four evils that burdened the industrial sector in 
1978. Furthermore, statistics show that in 1949, 
agriculture accounted for 70 per cent of the gross value of 
industry and agriculture. By contrast, in 1979, the gross 
value declined to 29.7 per cent.55
The market economy, which had been systematically 
destroyed during the 1950s, came to be seen as indispensable 
for reducing the discontinuities and waste that marked the 
bureaucratic management of the economy. Unfortunately, the 
overwhelming majority of leaders at the intermediate or 
local levels were not prepared for the changes of economic 
policy.
This was partly due to the fact that, like the 
Hungarian and Soviet systems, the Chinese system of
65Wang, p. 14.
industrial management bears the imprint of state control 
over the economy. For instance, although factory managers 
now have the power to appoint and dismiss administrative 
staff, it remains the case that an industrial unit is not 
free to hire or fire employees in terms of its economic 
objectives. Instead, it still must submit its decisions to 
the labor bureau. Consequently, most factories have 
remained at the "big and all-embracing" stage since they 
were first established.
The priorities of the 1950s had been heavy industry, 
light industry, and agriculture, in that order. Although 
this ordering was formally reversed in 1970, with 
agriculture nominally given top priority, implementation of 
the new ordering was not rigorously pursued until after 
1978. In the agricultural sector, real per capita income 
doubled between 1978 and 19 8 3 . 66 During this same period, 
output in this sector increased by over 61 per cent.67 In 
the case of the Chinese economic recovery in the first half 
of the 1980s, as well as the improvements in the Hungarian 
economy under the New Economic Mechanism (NEM), it was rural 
revitalization that dominated. The ongoing economic reforms 
in China, which began in agriculture, are now slowly 
spreading to manufacturing and other sectors.
66Lippit, p. 123.
67Mcmillan et al., pp. 781-2.
38
3.2 The Agricultural Sector
Mao Zedong assumed power in China in 1949, and the 
first people's commune was set up in April 1958. They grew 
to include 98 per cent of all rural households.68 Farmers 
gradually adjusted to the fact that communal farming meant 
communal rewards. The communal system was a thrust by the 
state to establish full control over the countryside.
The U. S. Department of Agriculture recently 
suggested that there was a decrease in the agricultural 
production of grain, cotton, oilseeds, and sugarcane after 
the introduction of communal farming.69 This was due 
primarily to the extreme rapidity of the move to 
communization that precluded the opportunity to correct 
problems that arose in the transitional period. One of 
these major problems was that in most cases, food and income 
were distributed according to "need," and there was little 
inducement to work for the collectivity. The communes were 
expected to serve as -a model for the agricultural sector.
From the beginning, however, production teams had 
difficulty in motivating farmers to work hard because the 
farmers did not receive the value of the marginal product of 
their labor under the payment system. By the time Deng
68Woodruff, pp. 54-5.
69Lippit, p. 174.
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Xiaoping came to power in 1978, the politically inspired 
measure of offering the workers in groups increased wages 
and bonuses to win their confidence and allegiance was 
exhausted. In other words, by commanding farmers to produce 
as teams and not pay them according to their individual 
labor productivity, the commune failed to effectively manage 
the production of farm products.70
Beginning in the province of Sichuan, the traditional 
breadbasket and rice bowl in southwest China, the changes in 
the late 1970s reversed virtually everything Mao had stood 
for in China's countryside. The government under Deng 
Xiaoping began shifting away from a state regulated 
agricultural system towards a system that permitted farmers 
to produce whatever they wanted in response to government 
prices and local market conditions.71 This decentralization 
of agricultural decision making along with the return to 
individual family farming under the "household 
responsibility system" have been the most notable reforms in 
the agricultural sector.
The household responsibility system has led to the 
virtual disappearance of the communes. Under this system, 
the collective assigned plots of land to individual peasant
70Gregory C. Chow, The Chinese Economy (New York: Harper
and Row, 1985), p. 48.
71 China Daily. October 9, 1984, in Foreign Broadcast
Information Service (FBIS), October 9, 1984, p. K 1.
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families not to own, but to farm.72 The thrust of the
reforms was to tie incomes as closely as possible to 
individual effort and productive accomplishment, to make 
individuals responsible for their own performance. Since 
1985, when the state stopped mandatory purchases of 
agricultural products, peasants in theory have been free to 
decide what crops to grow and whether to sell their crops to 
the government or on the open market.73
These new policies in the countryside have been 
designed to tap enormous latent labor potential. In 
essence, reforms in the agricultural sector have changed 
peasant production from a collective to a private practice. 
The agricultural reforms have had an enormous impact on 
rural output and productivity. For example, agricultural 
output grew at an average annual rate of over 10 per cent 
between 1978 and 1987 compared with 4 per cent in the late 
1960s and 1970s. Furthermore, the productivity of both land 
and labor since 1978 has risen at twice the average rate 
between 1953 and 1978.74 Thus, the reforms of the
72Harry Harding, China 1s Second Revolution: Reform After
Mao (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987), p.
103.
73Richard Feinberg, et al., Economic Reform In Three 
Giants: U.S. Foreign Policy and The USSR. China, and India
(Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1990), p.
78.
74Lee Travers, "Post-1978 Rural Economic Policy and 
Peasant Income in China," China Quarterly, no. 98, June 1984, 
pp. 245-46.
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agricultural sector in China have demonstrated the success 
of a strategy based on mobilizing individual initiative 
through market incentives.
The growth of agricultural output during this period 
was not due to a sudden increase in the supply of fixed 
capital inputs. Rather, it occurred mainly because of an 
extremely rapid growth of agricultural labor productivity.
It seems clear that the new incentive effects of the 
responsibility system have yielded these large benefits.
Some scholars have suggested that the same benefits would 
occur if similar reforms were applied to the industrial 
sector.75
The major dilemma that presently confronts China in 
regard to the agricultural sector is how to sustain the 
momentum generated by the first phase of reforms by 
generating sufficient new investment in agriculture. The 
allocation of agricultural land to peasants shifts 
responsibility to them to reinvest the resources that can 
keep the reform movement moving forward. Uncertain of the 
long-term fate of the household responsibility system, 
peasants have been reluctant to make permanent, nonmobile 
investments in their land, because of fear that improvements 
would be confiscated if their plots were later reabsorbed 
into a collective farm.76
75McMillan, et al., p. 783.
76Harding, p. 107.
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The success of the responsibility system that was 
introduced in this sector links income much more closely 
with individual work effort than the commune system, and 
encourages entrepreneurial initiatives by the peasantry. By 
the late 1980s, the responsibility system was being applied 
throughout the Chinese countryside. During this period, 
agricultural production grew by an average of 7.9 per cent 
per annum.77
3.3 The Industrial Sector
The post-Mao economic reforms in the industrial sector 
have given managers greater independence in running their 
enterprises, the ability to retain more financial resources 
and decide on their use, and more responsibility for their 
enterprises' profitability. In 1979> an experiment was 
conducted whereby enterprises retained a portion of their 
profits, but they could not rely on the state to cover their 
expenses or losses. This experiment brought about an 
increase in the income of the state, the enterprises, and 
the workers, and better goal congruence among all three 
parties. Nevertheless, the attempts to promote greater 
autonomy in enterprise management have been among the most 
difficult to implement effectively.
77Lippit, p. 123.
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Despite frequent discussions of a market economy and 
the increase in private entrepreneurship, state-owned 
enterprises still dominate the industrial sector, and the 
government exercises a powerful influence over prices, 
investment, and allocation.78 The following excerpt by 
Zhou Xulian in 1982 is still indicative of some of the major 
problems that continue to confront Chinese economic 
reforms:
The system of economic administration practiced in 
our country today was adopted from the Soviet Union in 
the early 1950s. The particular characteristic of this 
administrative system is to stress the extremely 
centralized leadership of the economy by the state.
The state directs and manages the affairs of state- 
owned enterprises, large or small. It centrally 
determines the prices of commodities. It takes a 
large fraction of the profits of the enterprises and 
subsidizes their losses. Under this administrative 
system an enterprise is not a self-propelling entity 
but rather a bead of the abacus of the state 
administration, lacking a necessary sense of 
independence and strong economic motivation.79
It was recognized from the beginning of these economic
reforms that coordination of agricultural reforms and
industrial reforms would be problematic at the national
level, although, in the announced policy, modernizing the
agricultural sector of the economy would require a larger
portion of industrial inputs.
The imbalances affecting the industrial sector proved
to be greater in the late 1970s than they had been in 1958.
78Harding, p. 4.
79Chow, p. 147.
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The political leadership recognized that the shortage of 
consumer goods and the stagnation in housing construction, 
among other problems, worsened the social malaise. There 
was a felt need to reverse priorities. This was prompted by 
a survey by the Ministry of Light Industry which revealed 
that an investment of 10,000 yuan created 94 jobs in heavy 
industry, 257 in light industry, and 800 in handicrafts.80 
The same report also showed that there was a low rate of 
profitability in all of these areas. As the output of the 
industrial sector fell in the late 1970s, the Chinese 
leadership devoted increased funds to the agricultural 
sector.
In the past, enterprises handed over profits at the end 
of the fiscal year, once production costs had been paid. In 
June of 1983, however, a new system of accounting was 
instituted. Under this arrangement, enterprises moved to a 
profit-based accounting system under which they paid regular 
taxes to the central authorities on production profits. The 
central authorities have continually stressed that they 
intend to phase out enterprises that do not operate at a 
profit. However, this has still not occurred throughout much 
of China. There is still centralized allocation of 
investment in human resources and raw materials in "critical 
areas" of industry.
80Feuchtwang et al., p. 108.
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There has been political debate in the Chinese 
leadership regarding the role of small-scale private 
businesses and medium-scale cooperatively owned factories.
It would appear that small, private cooperatives and 
village-run factories could provide an impetus to 
production. However, this reform has been subjected to very 
strict limits. For instance, despite the political and 
economic disruption that occurred periodically in the last 
three decades in China, there was resistance to change on 
the part of central planners and enterprise management.
i
Some planners and other political officials look back to the 
1950s and feel that the centralized planning model can be 
restored. Furthermore, Deng Xiaoping had to confront the 
fact that China's present economic success makes the case 
for extension of radical reform from agriculture to industry 
seem less imperative than it appeared for Hungary. What 
makes the argument more difficult for Deng Xiaoping is that 
agriculture supplies roughly 75 per cent of the raw 
materials for the industrial sector.81
It cannot be dismissed that there has been the painful 
realization that the country*s industries are still wholly 
unsuited to cope with the modern world.82 In addition, 
each factory is part of an interrelated system of
81Allen S. Whiting and Robert F. Dernberger, China1s 
Future: Foreign Policy and Economic Development In The Post-
Mao Era (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977), p. 148.
82Woodruff, pp. 62-3.
commercial, transportation, and production sectors. The 
Party, the state, and the workers’ congress all retain 
significant residual powers that limit the autonomy of 
factory managers.83 These factories are still viewed in 
essentially political, rather than economic terms. The 
reason for this is that during the Maoist period, 
accumulation rates were high and investment was devoted to 
the expansion of heavy industry at the sacrifice of 
consumption. This served the interests of the 
administrative-bureaucratic hierarchy at the expense of the 
ordinary working people. The party-run distribution and 
decision-making apparatus still assumes precedence over 
production decisions. In practice, this has usually meant 
that all significant decisions in a Chinese factory still 
must ultimately be approved, if not actually made, by the 
factory's party secretary.84
The proposed workers' self-management system implies 
enterprise operational autonomy in relation to the state. 
Proponents of workers' self-management invariably support 
alternative forms of public ownership to replace or modify 
state ownership. The major impediment to change has been 
that most political officials in China still feel that 
average industrial workers are not competent to manage
83Harding, p. 113.
84Liu Guoguang and Wang Xiangming, "A Study of The Speed 
and Balance of China's Economic Development." Social Sciences 
in China, no. r, 1980, pp. 6-7.
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complex, modern industries. The wide gulf between the 
advocates and opponents of workers' self-management in China 
reflects a conflict with the neo-Stalinist model that 
reformers in the industrial sector have been unable to 
overcome.
With workers' jobs guaranteed and wages independent of 
productivity in the neo-Stalinist model, the management has 
difficulty in motivating the labor force. It's main goal 
has not been to maximize profits, but to meet the production 
targets set by the planning authority and there is a lack of 
incentive for the management to increase outputs beyond the 
targeted amounts.85 This type of administrative planning 
and control is bureaucratic socialism par excellence. 
Industry still remains structured in such a way that it is 
mainly turning out products such as spare parts for its own 
maintenance, rather than for agriculture. There is still a 
lack of coordination between the sectors. The long 
obsession in China, Hungary, and the Soviet Union with heavy 
industry has effectively distorted the production structure.
3.4 The Special Economic Zones (SEZs)
The introduction of SEZs was one of the most important 
innovations of the Chinese economic reform program. SEZs
85Chow, p. 48.
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were conceived as instruments— small, specialized and 
limited in scope— to be laboratories in which different 
doses of market economy planning could be experimented with. 
SEZs were not organized, with planned inputs and planned 
production outputs tied to government targets, but if they 
were found to work, they could be adapted and imported into 
the socialist economy of China.
China's SEZs have no counterparts in other socialist 
countries at the present time. Their objective was not only 
to create jobs and generate foreign exchange but to build, 
from the ground up, completely modern cities that were also 
comprehensive economic development areas, with a high 
proportion of technology-intensive, knowledge-intensive, and 
capital-intensive enterprises.86
It has been suggested that the SEZs were established to 
give China a base for importing new managerial skills and 
technologies, for "learning the capitalist" way.87 Radical 
measures such as the abolition of planned targets could be 
tested in this setting. Also, SEZs were to serve as a link 
to the outside world by stimulating foreign investment and 
trade. This assumption seems correct given their 
geographical proximity to ocean transport routes.
86Jantes M. Ethridge, China1 s Unfinished Revolution: 
Problems And Prospects Since Mao (San Francisco: China Books
and Periodicals, 1988), p. 135.
87Michael Oborne, China1s Special Economic Zones (Paris: 
OECD, 1986), p. 152.
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The SEZs were intensively debated in 1978, when the 
political transition of power was occurring in China. Hua 
Guofeng (then Secretary-General of the Chinese Communist 
Party) presented a Ten Year Plan for the economy, with an 
emphasis on planned targets. By 1979, the focus of policy 
began to turn, as a detailed rethinking of the Ten Year Plan 
occurred among political leaders.
Deng Xiaoping became convinced of the need for much 
more sweeping reforms than Hua Guofeng was willing to 
undertake. Most important among these reforms, agriculture 
was to be emphasized over heavy industry. Readjustments and 
reform in China's rural and urban economic development 
required removal of the rigid central control and 
egalitarian ideology. The principal aim was to decentralize 
decision making, and this process was to begin with the 
SEZs. Hua Guofeng was subsequently removed as the nation's 
Premier, principally because of his role in formulating the 
Ten Year Plan.
During the period September 1979 to August 1980, the 
Fifth National People's Congress approved the Regulations on 
Special Economic Zones in Guangdong Province. Article 4 
focuses on the conditions of the SEZs:
In the special zones, investors are offered a wide 
scope of operation, favourable conditions for such 
operation are created and stable business sites are 
guaranteed. All items of industry, agriculture, 
tourism, housing and construction, research and 
manufacture involving high technologies and techniques 
that have positive significance in international 
economic co-operation and technical exchanges as well
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as other trades of common interest to investors and the 
Chinese side, can be established with foreign 
investment or in joint venture with Chinese 
investment.88
Although SEZs served as a testing ground for market forces, 
it is still important to remember that they are not 
integrated into the national economy. Since market forces 
are only operating in these isolated communities, there have 
been problems associated with the implementation of this 
experiment elsewhere.89 The most important is the fact 
that SEZs may simply not function as efficiently if they are 
integrated into the national economy as they do when left to 
operate in their own isolated worlds.
At this time, I do not expect any new SEZs to be 
created in China. This is partly because attempts are still 
being made to streamline existing ones. SEZs have more 
horizontal or decentralized integration between government 
and planning structures than the vertical or centralized 
integration that has characterized Chinese society as a 
whole. This is still a major obstacle that must be overcome 
before they are integrated into Chinese society.
For this and other reasons, it appears that Chinese 
leaders are interested in continuing their present policy of
88,,Laws and Regulations Concerning External Economic 
Relations," Guide To Foreign Economic Relations and Trade. 
Hong Kong, 1983, p. 187.
89Wang Dacheng, "Reforming The Foreign Trade Structure," 
Beiiina Review, vol. 27, no. 43, 1985, pp. 20-1.
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devoting resources to the agricultural and industrial 
sectors which are considered to be the core of the Chinese 
economy, rather than to these peripheral regions. But, some 
of the policies that underlay SEZ functioning have been 
applied to the wider segment of the Chinese economy. For 
instance, some provinces have been granted expanded 
authority over trade and investment decisions, without 
having to secure central approval.90
Gradually, however, Chinese leaders have learned that 
the zones' lack of physical facilities, shortages of skilled 
labor, and relative isolation from the rest of the country 
have produced high economic and social costs for the 
country.91 For instance, because the average wage in SEZs 
is about 50 per cent higher than in the rest of China, more 
foreign companies have recently tended to invest outside of 
the SEZs. Additionally, over 40 per cent of foreign 
investment projects in the SEZs are not manufacturing but 
tourist or commercial projects. As a result, the SEZs still 
greatly depend on China's domestic market. If the SEZs are 
expected to continue to provide a window to the world and 
act as a door through which new technologies and skills can
90Christopher Howe and Y. Y. Kueh, "China's International 
Trade: Policy and Organization Change and Their Place in The
Economic Readjustment," China Quarterly, no. 100, December 
1984, p. 813.
91Harding, p. 169.
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pass to China, they must move into a more market regulated, 
rather than experimentally isolated, environment.
3.5 Conclusions
Reformers in socialist countries have discovered that a 
society that becomes accustomed to predictable stagnation 
often finds it difficult to adjust to a situation that is 
more dynamic, but also more uncertain. The result of Mao's 
Cultural Revolution, which was launched in 1966, resulted in 
an actual fall in output a year later. The 1970s saw order 
restored and central planning re-established; but serious 
political conflict within the leadership continued to have 
adverse effects on the economy.
Moderates thought in terms of a long-term development 
plan while the left attacked planning as a whole and 
criticized proposals to use China's resources to pay for 
imported goods. Only Mao's death in 197 6 allowed for the 
institution of a new program that recognized the necessity 
of having agricultural reforms precede industrial reforms. 
Over 80 per cent of the materials used in light industry in 
China come from agriculture.92 The products produced by 
light industry in turn are major components in consumer
92Wang, p. 64.
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goods, and therefore are intimately connected with the 
standard of living.
As the analysis above has suggested, there remain some 
major differences between reform measures in the 
agricultural and industrial sectors that have fostered the 
success of the former over the latter. Consequently, the 
previous one-sided emphasis on heavy industry in China is 
being corrected. For example, just a year after the post- 
Mao leadership came to power, light industry grew at a 
faster pace than heavy industry. This decreased emphasis 
upon heavy industry has coincided with changes in 
agricultural policy. The state has exempted agricultural 
taxes for rural production brigades that have low incomes 
and reduced industrial levies for enterprises run by 
people's communes.
Once an independent farm household is asked to pay a 
fixed amount dependent on the productivity of the land it 
uses, the profit of the farm will largely reflect its 
efficiency rather than the possibly low costs of the 
material inputs.93 Another major difference is that the 
livelihood of the members of a production unit in the 
agricultural sector depends on the output of the unit, 
whereas the incomes of the managers and workers of a state- 
owned industrial enterprise are hardly affected by its 
output or profit.
93Chow, pp. 153-54.
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Certain key enterprises and major products that are 
vital to the economy (like coal, steel, and machine 
building) are difficult to seize from the grasp of mandatory 
state planning.94 Nevertheless, given the low productivity 
and poor quality of output that has characterized this 
sector of the economy, history provides the lesson that 
encouraging initiative in smaller enterprises certainly 
could not worsen the current situation. However, simply 
separating the government from the internal decision-making 
apparatus of enterprises will not be sufficient. There must 
be decentralized linkages between enterprises without state 
interference.
As the last chapter demonstrated, Hungary is a 
relatively more advanced, industrialized socialist country 
than China. Despite all of its recent successes, China 
remains a predominantly agricultural society. However, in 
both China and Hungary, it became apparent that the neo- 
Stalinist economic model had such severe shortcomings that 
beyond a certain point it retarded rather than promoted 
further economic development. Even more importantly, the 
Chinese have taken less than ten years to replicate what 
required thirty years to implement in Hungary.95
However, despite the introduction of SEZs on a limited 
scale, China is still poorly integrated in the world
94Ness, p. 141.
95Naylor, p. 90.
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economy. It remains self-sufficient in essential materials, 
and the arguments for reform based on foreign trade 
efficiency, which were so important in Hungary, have carried 
little weight in China. The SEZs provided the lesson that 
it is necessary to become connected to the world market 
economy. More favorably, however, they provided evidence 
that experiments with market forces are possible in a 
centralized environment, and this is a lesson that could be 
adopted in the Soviet Union today.
The examples of reform in the agricultural sector and 
the success of the SEZs attests to the new entrepreneurial 
energies that have been unleashed. At the same time, by not 
transforming the system of socialist ownership in the 
industrial sector, the current situation testifies to the 
problems of partial reform. Chinese economic reform 
provides the lesson to the Soviet Union that although reform 
can begin in the agricultural sector, it must not be 
emphasized entirely in that sector. Hungary, China, and the 
Soviet Union already have demonstrated the problems with 
overemphasizing a particular sector in the past— namely, 
industry. The issue in China, as well as in Hungary, and 
the Soviet Union, is not whether to devote all of its 
resources to any particular sector. Instead, at least in 
the case of Hungary and China, beginning reforms in the 
agricultural sector appear to have resulted in a higher 
standard of living and popular support for economic reforms.
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Given a conducive political environment for such reforms, 
the same lessons may be applied in the Soviet Union.
CHAPTER IV
ECONOMIC REFORMS IN THE SOVIET UNION SINCE 1985
4.1 Introduction
Soviet leaders have been willing to tolerate some 
economic deviation from the neo-Stalinist model, as long as 
it was not off the "road to socialism."96 As the previous 
chapters demonstrated, the emphasis upon agricultural 
reforms in Hungary and China initially fared more favorably 
than industrial reforms. However, in the Soviet Union, 
Gorbachev chose to do the reverse by emphasizing industrial 
reforms. This chapter will analyze the economic reform 
attempts in the Soviet Union since Mikhail Gorbachev came to 
power in 1985, in order to determine the reasons for this 
policy reversal, and also assess how far he has retreated 
from the neo-Stalinist model.
The long-term decline in the growth rate of the Soviet 
economy has proved to be the most pressing problem facing 
the Soviet leadership. This decline has been reflected in
96Peter Zwick, National Communism (London: Westview
Press, 1983), pp. 221-30.
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continued low productivity in agriculture and industry, a 
lag in the advanced technological sector, a decline in 
capital investments, and a decline in raw materials and 
energy resources.97 The economic growth rate was 6 per 
cent per year in the 1950s, less than 4 per cent in the 
1960s and 1970s, and about 3 per cent in the 1980s.98 In 
addition, whereas national income grew by 7.2 per cent in 
the 19 60s, its growth decreased to 5 per cent during the 
1970s and declined even further in the 1980s, falling to its 
lowest levels since World War II in 1984 (2.4 per cent).99 
These figures illustrate the dimensions of the economic 
problems confronting the Soviet Union.
By the end of the Brezhnev era in 1982, a variety of 
forces were working against the continued power of the neo- 
Stalinist bureaucracy. The cultivation of modernization, 
the expansion of the intelligentsia, and the need to rely on 
its expertise all made constant and detailed political 
interference counterproductive.100 Furthermore, it
97Arnold Horelick, "Policy Implications Of Change in The 
Soviet Union," Rand/UCLA Report. May 1989, p. 262.
98Lippit, p. 201.
"Jane S. Zacek, ed., The Gorbachev Generation: Issues
In Soviet Domestic Policy (New York: Paragon House, 1989),
p. 247.
100Robert V. Daniels, Is Russia Reformable? Change and 
Resistance From Stalin to Gorbachev (London: Westview Press,
1988) , p. 116.
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appeared that the conservatism of the Brezhnev leadership 
had lost all credibility.
With Gorbachev, the opportunity afforded by the end of 
the old leadership gave the new General Secretary the chance 
to restaff all branches of the Soviet institutional 
structure at a more rapid rate than had existed since World 
War II.101 As Gorbachev stated in his analysis of the 
problems in 1985:
We first discovered a slowing economic growth. In 
the last fifteen years the national income growth rates 
had declined by more than a half and by the beginning 
of the 1980s had fallen to a level close to economic 
stagnation. A country [the USSR] that was once quickly 
closing on the world's advanced nations began to lose 
one position after another. Moreover, the gap in the 
efficiency of production, quality of products, 
scientific and technological development, the 
production of advanced technology, and the use of 
advanced techniques began to widen, and not to our 
advantage.102
Hough argued that Gorbachev from the beginning enjoyed firm 
support in the Central Committee, which permitted him to 
consolidate his power at the pinnacle.103 Indeed, it has 
been suggested that there may have been an agreement between 
Chernenko and Gorbachev on the phasing of the transfer of 
power following Andropov's death in 1984 . 104 At the 
Nineteenth CPSU Conference in 1985, Yegor Ligachev confirmed
101Ibid., p. 100.
102Ness, pp. 2-3.
103 Jerry F. Hough, Opening Up The Soviet Economy
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution), p. 27.
104Ibid. . p. 27.
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that a strong coalition of Viktor Chebrikov (KGB chairman), 
Andrei Gromyko (Foreign Minister), Mikhail Solomentsev 
(Chairman of the Party Control Commission) and "a large 
group of obkom first secretaries" enabled the Central 
Committee to take "the only correct decision" in appointing 
Gorbachev.105
It should have been recognized that the performance of 
the Soviet economy would prove critical to the effectiveness 
of the new regime. Gorbachev moved swiftly against some 
rivals, yet he maintained a balanced team.106 Although he 
displayed goodwill towards such rivals as Yegor Ligachev and 
Boris Yeltsin, he succeeded in eliminating most of his clear 
opponents. All of the fourteen republic party secretaries, 
for instance, were replaced between 1986 and 1989. There 
was certainly no doubt that Gorbachev formed a leadership 
team that reflected his priorities, with Yegor Ligachev, not 
yet an opponent, the number two man in the Soviet Union.
But, as became apparent in later years, many of Gorbachev's 
political appointees expressed doubts about the scope and 
pace of change.
Over the next 6 years, the Soviet reform process 
underwent a cycle from moderation to increased 
radicalization back to moderation once again. Subsequently,
105Ronald J. Hill and Jan A. Dellenbrant, Gorbachev and
Perestroika; Towards a New Socialism? (England; Edward 
Elgar, 1989), p. 197.
106Ibid. . p. 16.
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the evolution of Gorbachev's reform strategy took the form 
of a more or less ad-hoc reaction to events. Gorbachev 
realized that the Soviet Union's economic system was in 
trouble, but he had not developed any coherent remedies to 
cure its afflictions. He attempted to minimize adverse 
reaction from pressure groups that would mobilize if 
perestroika's economic content was made more ambitious.107 
This was to prove especially true in regard to the 
agricultural sector.
In the spring of 1985, Gorbachev and Ligachev were 
political allies. However, this changed over the next few 
years, when Ligachev realized the full potential of 
Gorbachev's reform proposals, and in particular, the threat 
they posed to the party apparatus and ministers. As 
Ligachev stated in 1987:
Is there any guarantee that the reforms will be 
accomplished in full, without deformations and 
deviations. Of course, there are. Above all there is 
the leading role of the Communist Party in the process 
of perestroika.108
By 1988, Ligachev was in control of Soviet agricultural 
policy, as the Secretary of Agriculture. He and Chebrikov 
had become much more conservative in their views of 
perestroika, and were opponents of privatization of the
107Desai, p. 104.
108Christopher Donnelly, Gorbachev's Revolution: Economic
Pressures and Defence Realities (England: Jane's Information
Group, 1989), p. 26.
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economy. Ligachev had repeatedly spoken on the role of 
agriculture, but he continued to say as little as possible 
about reform measures. For instance, he did not even 
mention the possibility of family farms or leaseholds. As 
Aslund suggested, Ligachev "appeared to drag his feet 
without offering any alternative."109 The strong political 
position of conservatives such as Ligachev was a primary 
reason that the Soviet Union did not follow the reform 
process of Hungary and China, and emphasize reforms in the 
agricultural sector. In addition, Ligachev's political 
attacks on the speed of Gorbachev's policies were not 
concentrated upon Gorbachev's decision to emphasize economic 
reforms in the industrial sector. His conservative approach 
did not exclude alterations in the economy, but promoted 
changes that would continue to preserve the status-quo.110
In October 1988, Yeltsin launched a bitter 
attack upon Ligachev, suggesting that he had impeded reform 
measures.111 Yeltsin went so far as to argue that even 
Gorbachev's policies were benefitting no one.112 Yeltsin's 
behavior in this matter was unusual in that he "went public" 
in the dispute with his colleagues. He was impatient with
109Anders Aslund, Gorbachev's Struggle For Economic Reform 
(New York: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 57.
110Ibid. , p. 55.
m Donnelly, p. 26.
112Donnelly, p. 28.
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what he considered the slow pace of needed reforms. He was 
stripped of his Politburo candidate membership, but was 
allowed to retain the rank of minister and his membership in 
the Central Committee.
As a result of this debate, Gorbachev began to depict 
himself as a man of moderation, caught between the two 
camps. In a meeting with newspaper and journal editors in 
1988, he stated that "the danger to his policies lay not 
only on the Yeltsinist left but also and especially on the 
political right.113 He continued to argue that he 
supported the "socialist choice" of step-by-step reforms and 
the maintenance of the Soviet Union.114 As Yegor Ligachev 
pointed out, the problem is that "blind radicalism, 
improvisation, and swerving from side to side have yielded 
us little good."115
The economic reform strategy adopted in 1987-88 sought 
to move the Soviet Union away from stifling bureaucratic 
control through adjustments in the planning system which 
would, it was hoped, increase its efficiency without 
dismantling it altogether. In particular, Gorbachev's 
reform movement had three goals: (1) to reinvigorate
economic growth; (2) to restructure the Soviet economy
113Pravda, 13 January, 1988.
114,1 Gorbachev Lashes Democratic Opposition," Washington 
Post. 27 February 1991, Sec. A, p. A 14, col. 1.
115John Kohan, "It's Lonely Up There," Time. July 16, 
1990, p. 31.
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towards consumer goods and social services? (3) to shift 
from extensive to intensive growth based on innovating new 
products.
Gorbachev attempted to weaken the vertical links 
between ministries and enterprises by removing approximately 
one-third of the bureaucracy. Each reshuffle that Gorbachev 
implemented had been hailed as a defeat of the 
conservatives. Although he replaced thousands of personnel 
all over the Soviet Union, he did not resort to a massive 
retirement plan. Deng Xiaoping utilized a retirement plan 
in China in order to get rid of millions of unproductive 
civil servants and military officials. In many parts of the 
Soviet Union, acute labor shortages made such a strategy 
impractical.116 By the late 1980s, out of twelve full 
Politburo members, Gorbachev could only count on the support 
of two, Shevardnadze and Yakovlev.117 While the 
conservatives lacked a common alternative policy or the 
means to pursue it, what they did have was the ability to 
impede the adoption and implementation of radical 
policies.118 As the new Russian republic leader Boris 
Yeltsin recently suggested:
The objective results of the past six years have
shown that we have been dealing not with perestroika
116Naylor, p. 220.
117Richard Sakwa, Gorbachev and His Reforms: 1985-1990
(New York: Prentice Hall, 1990), p. 18.
118Ibid. . p. 363.
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[restructuring] but rather the last phase of
stagnation.119
4.2 The Agricultural Sector
Agriculture remains "the" problem sector, the overall 
ineffectiveness of which leads to distortions in the 
allocation of resources. It is an obstacle to the Soviet 
Union's attaining the status of a modern society. Unlike 
the situation in Hungary and China, the party has been 
significantly entrenched in the Soviet countryside where 
conservative opposition to reform has constituted a 
bottleneck to rapid and substantial progress.
The Soviet Union has continued to rely on imports of 
farm products. When Gorbachev came to power in 198 5, Soviet 
agriculture produced only 80 per cent of the U.S. 
agricultural output, but it required eight times the number 
of farm workers.120 Despite the fact that Gorbachev worked 
in the agricultural sector of the economy for much of his 
career, in his first few years in office he introduced no 
major reforms in this area.
The Soviet Union needs to become more self-sufficient 
in agricultural products and foodstuffs. Although it
ii9»i Yeltsin Urges Talks To Overhaul Nation," The
Washington Post. 30 March 1991, Sec. A, p. A 14, cols. 4-5.
120Zacek, p. 249.
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allocated 33 per cent of its total investment and 3 0 per 
cent of its total labor force to agriculture, by 1985 it had 
not attained self-sufficiency in agricultural production. 
Part of the problem was that the share of agricultural 
employment in Soviet total civilian employment declined from 
49 to 18 per cent in the 1940-85 period, but by far the 
greater problem is poor productivity and huge spoilage of 
products due to inadequate transport and marketing 
systems.121 The sector also suffered from the relative 
priority given to heavy industry and to an overemphasis on 
gross output results in agriculture.122
As the Hungarian and Chinese reforms demonstrated, 
reform in this sector in the mid-1980s could have brought 
increased productivity almost immediately, and would have 
likely solved many of the political problems that Gorbachev 
later encountered. However, top party leaders in the Soviet 
Union such as Ligachev and Yeltsin remained divided over the 
merits of the family farming programme. Gorbachev himself 
even expressed these concerns at a Party Plenum in March 
1989:
Great concern over [food supply has been] raised 
at a recent Party report-back and election meetings and 
conferences...The real situation is such that we are 
experiencing shortages of farm produce. The state has 
to buy large quantities of grain, meat, fruit,
121See, for instance, Narod Noe Khoziaistvo SSSR, 1985,
pp. 390-1.
122Feinberg et al., p. 59.
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vegetables, and some other produce abroad. We are 
still behind developed countries, big and small, in 
productivity, yield capacity of fields and livestock 
productivity and in the diversity and quality of 
foodstuffs. The gap is widening rather than narrowing. 
The shortage of food creates social tension and 
generates not merely criticism but actual discontent on 
the part of the people...So far, we have been unable to 
find a cardinal solution to the food problem despite 
the fact that this is a country which 
possesses such great potential.123
The very limited number of family contract teams (or 
groups of families working together) that have come into 
existence have achieved a sharp rise in labor productivity 
and an increase in food production. However, at the urging 
of more conservative leaders, Gorbachev hesitated in 
breaking up state farms and turning them into private farms. 
Ligachev and other critics had expressed fears that such 
action would cause the break-up of the Soviet Union. 
Agricultural producers have been forced to continue the 
practice of selling most of their output to the government 
at low prices. Private activity was.only supposed to act 
where the socialist sector had failed entirely, that is to 
complement and not to compete with the socialist sector, 
neither for inputs nor on output markets.124
As a consequence, food rationing went into effect in 
many parts of the Soviet Union in 1988. Gorbachev actually 
strengthened the existing neo-Stalinist system in this
123David Lane, Soviet Society Under Perestroika (London:
Unwin Hyman, 1990), p. 46.
124Aslund, p. 160.
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sector by creating a new agricultural super-ministry known 
as Gosagroprom. By 1989, the ministry was "flooding the 
collective farms with instructions and regulations," which 
amounted to more than 5,000 categories of forms and 
bulletins, containing eight million planning indicators.125 
In March of 1989, Gorbachev decided to abolish Gosagroprom 
but reaffirmed the collective principle and denied that 
there was any intention of returning to private landed 
property.
Rather than confront the idea of moving to private 
farming, Gorbachev tried to give rewards and incentives 
within the context of socialist ownership. For instance, 
Gorbachev felt that the ideal model was the kolkhoz, where 
work is performed by teams of peasants who have leased land. 
Consequently, in 1988-89, farmers were allowed to lease (not 
own) land privately. The problem has been that leaseholders 
were totally dependent on the kolkhoz. They had to grow 
what they were instructed to, and had to utilize the 
equipment that was provided to them. Additionally, 
industrial enterprises could take away their land when it 
was in their interest.126 Thus, there was no attempt to 
transform the kolkhozes into cooperatives, which have proven 
successful in other countries. It should be recalled that
125Goldman, p. 165.
126Donald D. Barry et al., Perestroika At The Crossroads 
(New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1991), p. 190.
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the Hungarian cooperative movement became successful only 
after the cooperatives became independent of the state.127
Although work groups within state and collective farms 
have been encouraged to lease land and equipment and work on 
a contract basis, the element of private ownership on a 
larger scale is still absent in the Soviet Union. 
Furthermore, even these limited changes were obstructed by 
political and ideological reservations. For instance, the 
decision to grant leases was left up to the collective and 
state farms, which were hardly likely to exercise it in a 
permissive manner.
Although the new Soviet leadership called for radical 
changes in the agricultural sector in 1985, there was very 
little departure from the neo-Stalinist model. In 
particular, the appointment of Ligachev as agricultural 
secretary certainly did not assist the reform process in 
this sector. The resistance of such conservative reformers 
prevented many of the bold approaches that were implemented 
in Hungary and China. Instead, a series of piecemeal 
measures were attempted, which failed to produce 
improvements. The failure of agriculturalists to free 
themselves from the clutches of the bureaucracy revealed the 
gulf between Gorbachev's rhetoric on breaking down the neo-
127Ibid., p. 190.
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Stalinist structures in agriculture and the rather diffident 
policies actually proposed.128
4.3 The Industrial Sector
The industrial reform movement since 1985 has proved an 
even more difficult undertaking than reform in the 
agricultural sector. The theoretical reform program called 
for state planners to stop meddling in enterprises on every 
minute detail. It consisted of four components: (1) The
state could no longer tell each factory what to produce or 
to whom to sell their products (2) State distribution of 
materials was to be phased out. Enterprises were to buy raw 
materials directly from the enterprise that made them (3) 
The annual plan would be eliminated, and replaced with a 
Five-year plan with broad targets (4) Enterprises would 
finance their own investment activities.
In practice, however, control over enterprises by the 
ministries was not abolished, but there was less political 
resistance to reforms in this sector than in the 
agricultural sector. Unlike the situation in agriculture, 
reforms in this sector would not necessarily deprive a large 
share of the party apparatus of its reason to exist. As the 
analysis below demonstrates, the reform measures by
128Sakwa, pp. 290-1.
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Gorbachev in the industrial sector over the past 6 years 
have actually served to make the party apparatus more 
entrenched than streamlined.
In order for the goals of this reform program to be 
implemented, the Soviet system was supposed to set up a 
stock market, whereby citizens could buy shares in 
enterprises. This process would not only make enterprises 
self-financing, but would also increase discipline and 
profitability. Even on paper, however, the reforms did not 
go far enough to inject market-forces into the economy. The 
role of central planning kept operating in much of the same 
way that it did prior to the Gorbachev regime.
As an example, ministries, instead of overseeing the 
input and output operations of enterprises, were to concern 
themselves with investment and technology policy. The 
problem was that the ministries continued to be held 
responsible for final results, rather than the enterprises. 
Since the ministries were held responsible, they were not 
willing to give up their levers for plan fulfillment. In 
particular, enterprises did not really make their own 
decisions, the annual plan was not abolished, and ministries 
were still responsible for making firms adhere to planned 
targets.
In 1986, a system of "state orders" was introduced and 
the overwhelming majority of industrial production is now 
produced according to these orders. State orders, however,
72
are the same production plans with a different name. 
Similarly, enterprises are supposed to be guided by a five- 
year plan which they compile themselves. Nevertheless, 
their five-year plans must be partly based on "control 
figures" received from Gosplan and other ministries.129 
The central offices delegated decisions about state purchase 
orders to the various ministries, leaving no room for 
independent economic activity.
Since they were strictly bound by the central plan, 
enterprises did not have the right to change the volume or 
the variety of output even if they had the resources to 
produce goods in great demand on the most favorable terms. 
Thus, the economic environment for enterprises has remained 
unstable. A production plan that more or less balances 
available resources can be changed several times in the 
course of a year.130
A major aim of the economic reform program in this 
sector was to stimulate rapid technological progress. It 
was hoped that enterprises would compete against each other 
for orders and would be under pressure to make profits and 
eliminate losses.131 Firms that operated under market
129Michael Ellman, The USSR In The 1990s: Struggling Out
Of Stagnation (London: Economic Intelligence Unit, 1989), p.
39.
130Tatyana Zaslavskaya, The Second Socialist Revolution: 
An Alternative Soviet Strategy (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1990), p. 72.
131Ellman, p. 38.
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conditions would be responsive to the needs of consumers, 
not planners. The problem was that there has been hardly 
any change, except that an enterprise that did realize 
profits often had them transferred to the state budget.
In 1987, the Soviet Union passed a new law on the state 
enterprise, formulated primarily by Gorbachev and Nikolai 
Ryzhkov. The stress was on the independent industrial firm, 
which was to be "loosely" controlled by the central 
bureaucracy.132 Worker's self-management was supposed to 
shift more decision making from the ministries to the 
workers. By 1988, this model was deemed unworkable by the 
leadership. The Gorbachev regime admitted that they had 
failed to shift decision making from the economic 
bureaucracy to the enterprises. However, this was to be 
expected, since Article 9 of the Law On State Enterprises 
stated the following:
The supervising organ must not intervene in the 
enterprise's operation and economic activity, while it 
must control the activity of the enterprise.133
The system of state orders and centralized micro-
economic planning still conduct business as usual. Notions
of autonomy in this sector have not only been stalled, they
were effectively blocked by the party apparatus.134 Soviet
132Aslund, p. 180.
133Barry et al., pp. 180-1.
134John E. Tedstrom, ed. , Socialism. Perestroika. and The 
Dilemmas Of Soviet Economic Reform (London: Westview Press,
1990), p. 171.
managers today have no idea about how to function in a 
market-oriented economy. They have always been sheltered by 
being able to look upwards for guidance. Furthermore, the 
enterprise has become so entangled in a web of directives 
that it has lost all sense of initiative, content to take 
life as it comes, safe in the knowledge that the state will 
pick up the bill and pay the wages of its workers.135 The 
rigidities, the overcentralization, the built-in 
disincentives for innovation and initiative, the burdensome
bureaucratization all mean that in the absence of a
radical transformation in the administration of the neo- 
Stalinist economy, the USSR's relative position as an 
industrial power will continue to decline.136 In fact, the 
1.7 per cent rise in industrial output in 1989 was the worst 
result in the Soviet Union since 1945.137
4.4 Conclusions
Already in 1982, when Brezhnev died, it was apparent 
that the Soviet economy had been allowed to drift by a 
complacent if not actually incompetent group of leaders. By
135Basile Kerblay, Gorbachev1 s Russia (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1989), p. 31.
136Horelick, p. 262.
137Sakwa, p. 281.
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the spring of 1985, there was a feeling that sharp, 
immediate remedial action was vital, not only for the Soviet 
Union's self-esteem and international prestige, but even for 
the system's survival. As the analysis above reveals, the 
problem has been that Gorbachev was too focused on the 
notion of economic gradualism in the economic reform 
process. He has had to conduct a balancing act between 
conservatives who want to "further perfect" the neo- 
Stalinist model and liberals who want to eradicate it. The 
problem is that it is the political and economic structure 
of the economy that retards rapid changes and renders the 
economy inflexible in the face of a rapidly changing 
environment.138
As a result of all of these failures, it is now clear 
that Gorbachev has not fulfilled his promises.
Unfortunately, the growth rate is lower than ever before, 
the flow of consumer goods has not increased, and the Soviet 
economic system has failed to make the change from an 
extensive to an intensive growth strategy. The system of 
management that has been in operation is still characterized 
by excessive centralization, extreme rigidity, and poor 
adaptability to different and changing conditions in place 
and time. As Roy Medvedev pointed out:
Gorbachev is having to face the fact that with the
138John P. Hardt and Sheila N. Heslin, Perestroika: A
Sustainable Process For Change (New York: Group of Thirty,
1989), p. 46.
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exception of some people in the [privately run] 
cooperative sector, perestroika reforms in six years 
have improved the material life of absolutely no one in 
the country. In most cases, life is worse.139
This is because Gorbachev has attacked the problems of the
economy by reorganizing bureaucratic structures and
rearranging rights and responsibilities among the various
layers in the administrative hierarchy.1*0 The leadership
did not take charge and solve the problems of the neo-
Stalinist model by moving substantially further towards the
market.
While the transition from the neo-Stalinist model is 
complex, problems can be alleviated if an approach is
adopted that builds upon the Hungarian and Chinese lessons.
Despite knowledge of poor agricultural performance in the
Soviet Union, the leadership responded with limited
administrative changes aimed at improving performance while 
keeping the structure centralized. Consequently, there was 
hardly any success resembling the reform programs that have 
been achieved in these other countries.
The Soviet leadership believed that the Soviets had to 
maintain state targets on "critical goods." Although the 
enterprises were supposed to receive increased autonomy, the 
central administration was still supposed to guarantee the
139"Gorbachev Proposes Tough Crisis Measures," The 
Washington Post. 10 April 1991, Sec. A, p. A 27, col. 4.
U0Susan J. Linz and William Moskoff, Reorganization and 
Reform In The Soviet Union (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1988),
p. 19.
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supply of certain products to the economy.141 The problem 
was that this eventually meant that the production of almost 
everything one can imagine remained under state control.
That established a contradiction between the new rights of 
enterprises and hierarchical relationships which continued 
to be dominated from above. Ministerial operation of 
enterprises has continued to undermine all possibilities of 
reform. To the extent that the government keeps its older 
goals in mind and goes after maximum capacity at the expense 
of efficiency, it sets long-term indicators at different 
levels for more and less profitable enterprises.142
All of Gorbachev's proposals thus far have 
unrealistically assumed that the Soviet Union can obtain the 
growth of a market economy without sacrificing 
egalitarianism and state controls, as well as the security 
provided by a socialist system. The new accounting 
arrangements, for example, do not create markets or 
competition, and profit-based incentives will continue to be 
deprived of real economic content because administratively 
determined prices are* retained.143 Compromises and half- 
measures are ultimately unworkable. As Iurri Andropov once 
pointed out, "It is insufficient just to improve the system
141Ed A. Hewett, Reforming The Soviet Economy: Equality
Versus Efficiency (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1988), p. 24.
142Juviler and Kimura, p. 92.
143Linz and Moskoff, p. 20.
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of rewards; one must also produce the necessary quantity of 
commodities which are in demand."144
Gorbachev's response to this problem has been that "We 
write the rules here, and we will not accept anyone 
dictating to us. We do not need any teachers or lessons 
from anyone."145 This is precisely the reason why the 
Soviet economy today is in worse shape than at any time 
since the Soviets took over in 192 5. Gorbachev has taken a 
path that mixes political caution with bold, but certainly 
not overly risky, reforms. Can he learn anything from the 
reform programs in Hungary and China? This is the question 
that will be addressed in the final chapter.
144"Rech General1 Nogosekretaria Tsk KPSS Tovarisctcha Iu. 
V. Andropova," Kommunist. no. 9, June 1983, p. 9.
145|lGorbachev Lashes Democratic Opposition," p. A 17.
CONCLUSIONS
There is a great deal of uncertainty and debate about 
the changes now taking place in the Soviet Union, but about 
one thing there does seem to be strong consensus: The 
Soviet Union today stands at a crossroads, with a future
more open to a range of diverse possibilities some of a
revolutionary kind than anyone could have imagined less
than six years ago.146 If Gorbachev remains on his present 
course of "reform,” the large-scale state sector will remain 
predominant and will probably remain subject to mainly 
bureaucratic, rather than market, forces.
The examples of economic reform offered by Hungary and 
China demonstrate that the neo-Stalinist economic model is 
capable of reform, even if it cannot be immediately 
eliminated. The purpose of employing the market as an 
instrument of reform in a command economy is to force 
competition and thereby enhance efficiency.147 Rather than 
relying upon central planning, there must be markets that 
are made competitive to ensure enterprise profits, and means 
must be found so that profits do not simply accrue to
146Horelick, p. 1.
147Ness, p. 3.
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monopolistic state-owned enterprises, or pass on the state.
Profits must arise from the competitive use of 
resources and the quality of production. Private economic 
activity has strong advantages in stimulating performance 
and it infringes on socialist values only slightly whenever 
three conditions exist: (1) The activity must be labor
intensive, so that it will not need to draw much on the 
central system for material inputs (2) It must involve 
great adaptability to satisfying the heterogenous tastes of 
purchasers (3) It must produce consumer goods for 
households rather than producer goods for the central 
system.148 The results that have been achieved in Hungary 
and China attest to the need for the Soviet Union to shift 
from state to more private ownership using these guidelines.
In the Soviet Union, a steady flow of inconsistent 
measures has resulted in little or no coherent coordination. 
The concentration of economic power in the upper echelons of 
an organizational-management pyramid automatically nullifies 
free management and leads to the suppression of individual 
initiative.149 Hungary and China demonstrated that only 
when the central ministries are eliminated, in any sector of 
the economy is it possible to expand enterprise autonomy and
148Bialer and Mandelbaum, p. 89.
149A. Ageev and D. Kuzin, "Socialism and 
Entrepreneurship," Soviet Review, vol. 32, no. 1, January- 
February 1991, p. 10.
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avoid recentralization.150
In China, the economy was made more market-oriented, 
especially with the dismantling of the communes. If Soviet 
land is eventually returned to the peasant as in the Chinese 
case, it is likely that eventually the state ownership of 
other means of production will be eliminated. As in 
Hungary, the reforms in China have now been expanded more 
successfully into the industrial sector of the economy, as 
these two countries attempt at different levels to move 
further away from the neo-Stalinist model. Measures in 
Hungary and China were approved to reduce the extent of 
central planning and the role of government and party in 
day-to-day business operations in this sector as well.151
An important difference, however, between Soviet and 
Chinese decollectivization is the apparent Soviet intention 
to concentrate any marketing activities in official 
organizations.152 This neglects a very important lesson 
that may be drawn from the Chinese economic reforms. A 
major reason for the improved availability of food in 
Chinese cities in the 1980s was the legalization of private 
retail trade, which currently accounts for approximately 17 
per cent of all retail trade.153
150Nee and Stark, p. 343.
151Linz and Moskoff, p. 41.
152Ellman, p. 27.
153Ellman, p. 27.
82
In addition, the Soviets might be successful were they 
to set up Special Economic Zones (SEZs) analogous to those 
in China. These could serve to attract foreign firms and 
provide increased connections to the world market. Western 
firms are interested in obtaining Soviet raw materials, 
access to hard currency markets in the Soviet Union, and 
markets for their own products and technical knowledge.15'1 
SEZs might offer foreign firms much greater freedom from 
bureaucratic restrictions than exists in the rest of the 
Soviet Union, and this may serve to pave the way for 
increased joint-ventures.
At the present time, the Soviet economy is in many ways 
a closed economy, in that external economic ties play a 
lesser role here than in many other countries. Increased 
contacts through the SEZ mechanism could speed initial 
reforms in the sector where they should have begun, namely 
agriculture. Many Soviet officials and senior economists 
have visited the Chinese Special Economic Zones and observed 
the household responsibility system at work. However, even 
reformists to date have written little and ambiguously about 
their operation.155
The Hungarian economic reforms in particular provide an 
example whereby agricultural cooperatives can sell to the
154Ellman, p. 97.
155See, for instance, Fedor Burlatski in Literaturnaya 
Gazeta, 11 June 1986 and Izvestiya, 19 January 1987.
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state or do their own marketing, and there is substantial 
autonomy in deciding on the use of profits. Likewise, even 
the state farms here have been able to do their own 
marketing, since the abolition of the central planning of 
farm production in 1968. Furthermore, people were 
compensated for land seized under communist rule. This was 
positive news for Hungarian farmers, who have been able to 
reclaim land taken from them before nationalization.156 
Nearly 50 per cent of Hungary's arable land could be claimed 
as a result of this bill passed by Parliament in April,
1991.
In the Soviet case, cooperatives and state farms are 
still centrally controlled through production and output 
quotas. Although a limited number of private plots operate 
on a market basis, the role of private farming has declined 
since Gorbachev came to power. In addition to the 
conservative bias that Gorbachev confronted, this is partly 
because of the fact that although restrictions on private 
agricultural production are now more relaxed, private 
producers still have'the lowest claim on state resources. 
Reforms must consist primarily of creating private plots or 
independent cooperatives with incentives to grow and sell 
one1s own output.
Competitive cooperatives in the agricultural sector may
156"Hungary To Give Land, Credit To Dispossessed," The 
Washington Post. 25 April 1991, Sec. A, p. A 22, col. 5.
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provide a measurement device for possibilities in the state 
enterprises. The present vertical hierarchy needs to be 
replaced by more horizontal integration. Hungary and China 
demonstrated that it is impossible to realize a new 
"intensive" growth strategy without changing the central 
institution of the neo-Stalinist legacy, i. e., the 
hierarchical administrative machinery that makes individuals 
responsive to higher level officials.157 At some point the 
large collective and state farms must necessarily be 
dismantled, and individuals must become responsive to 
markets, perhaps by farming cooperatives.
As I have pointed out previously, Gorbachev hesitated 
to implement reforms in the agricultural sector. Breaking 
from the pattern of "agriculture-first" established in 
Hungary and China was a crucial flaw that must be reversed. 
What made the regime's reluctance to take decisive action so 
puzzling was that this was an area in which radical 
institutional change could have been introduced on a broad 
scale in an isolatable context without dramatically changing 
the traditional central planning elsewhere.158 The fact 
that China successfully replicated the Hungarian experiment 
with a population 100 times the size of Hungary should 
further demonstrate the credibility of this experience in
157Bialer and Mandelbaum, p. 89.
158Bialer and Mandelbaum, p. 87.
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the eyes of Soviet leaders.159 Just as important is the 
fact that both countries demonstrated that in order for this 
process to be successful, it is necessary to have political 
leadership that can maneuver around the demands of liberal 
and conservative political forces.
There needs to be more support in the Soviet Union for 
a system of contracting agricultural production work to 
"teams, groups, and families," and a more flexible approach 
to the marketing of surplus agricultural produce.160 If 
they must remain, cooperatives would be given an opportunity 
to use or sell, as they see fit, all of the produce 
harvested over and above the production targets. In any 
event, cooperatives do work more efficiently than state 
enterprises and stimulate the development of new economic 
relations in the state economy.161 As the Hungarian 
reforms demonstrated, cooperatives in the Soviet Union must 
take on increased importance even if the country is 
reluctant to move further towards private ownership at the 
present moment.
Likewise, the reforms that have now resulted in the 
Hungarian and Chinese industrial sectors demonstrate that 
there is hope for the Soviet Union. The determinants of
159Naylor, p. ix.
160Naylor, p. 27.
161T. Kuznetsova, "Cooperatives: The Tactic Determining
The Practice," The Soviet Review, vol. 31, no. 2, March-April 
1990, p. 41.
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output are now controlled in Hungary and China by short-term 
plans made by firms, with the state making "informal 
requests." Again, output in the Soviet Union is still 
determined by state planners, despite the fact that economic 
reforms originated in this sector. More work obviously must 
be accomplished in this sector of economic reforms, but 
progress in Hungary and China is undeniable.
It is now certain that there is a need to promote 
efficiency by permitting economic competition. Competition 
comes from abroad as well as from competing firms at home. 
Hungary and China are already more extensively connected to 
the world economy than is the Soviet Union. In the 
Hungarian case in particular, competition was enhanced on a 
grand scale by participation in the world market economy. 
However, in order for this process to become effective, 
there is a need to encourage individual initiative and 
entrepreneurship, for which there is little room in a neo- 
Stalinist economic model.
As Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyan noted, "Industrial reform 
is a more complex matter than agricultural reform."162 
Although there are no ideal types, Gorbachev should move 
closer to the Hungarian and Chinese solutions, now that it 
has been demonstrated that limited changes in the industrial 
sector of the economy have failed to produce any dramatic 
achievements in the Soviet Union. In both Hungary and
162Nee and Stark, p. 331.
87
China, initial success in the agricultural sector led to 
increased demands by party and non-party personnel for a 
reduction in central planning in the industrial sector. 
Gorbachev and leaders of nine of the fifteen Soviet 
republics recently published a joint statement in the 
Communist Party newspaper Pravda. declaring their intention 
to work together to overcome the country's pending economic 
collapse.183 As Samuel Huntington suggested, "it seems 
that reforms are even more difficult than revolutions."164
163,iGorbachev, Yeltsin Sign Crisis Pact: Hard-Line Foes
Lose Leadership Challenge In Central Committee," The 
Washington Post. 25 April 1991, Sec. A, p. 1, col. 1.
184Samuel P. Huntington, American Politics: The Promise
of Disharmony (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981),
p. 120.
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